Meillassoux’s concept of justice is remote from the concerns of political philosophy and closer in spirit to a religious or eschatological vision. It isn’t immediately clear how to think about it, much less what to think. It offers little guidance for the organization of institutions in the actual world, and its dependence on speculative metaphysical premises (i.e., the supposed necessity of contingency) stands in marked contrast to the Rawlsian effort to minimize such assumptions. If, as Meillassoux claims, the supreme injustice is death, it’s difficult to see what institutions could meaningfully do to address so basic a fact of the human condition. (The right to life is already reasonably well-understood; a right against death is hardly actionable.) The effect is to divert attention from the more urgent and tractable questions of distributive fairness, individual and political rights, and institutional design. One can easily imagine, moreover, that in pursuing the impossible task of overcoming death a state might trample on individual rights or neglect the needs of the less advantaged. In this sense, Meillassoux’s account seems detached from the values and conditions that matter to real persons and communities.